

practices. The codes try to abate "cut-throat" competition, but the devices are heterogeneous and haphazard, and create great administrative difficulties. Real safeguarding of consumer interests, and positing of real criteria for price determination, are notably lacking. Especially is there apparent failure to attempt to attain some of the real economic *benefits* which should be expected in a control system, such as elimination of inefficient production. If industrial control cannot offer greater efficiency and greater benefit to the community, what can it offer? The pamphlet deliberately avoids "important questions of public policy," and appraisal of "practical effects as revealed in experience," but concludes nevertheless that "there seems little indication that the NRA . . . applied any clear-cut principles or standards of public policy in the matter of price control."

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CLAGUE, EWAN, WALTER J. COUPER and E. WIGHT BAKKE. *After the Shutdown*. Pp. 153. New Haven: Institute of Human Relations, Yale University, 1934.

Closing down permanently in 1929, two subsidiary plants of the United States Rubber Company in New Haven and Hartford left 2200 men out of work, many of whom had considered their living secure for life. What happened to these people? This book, *After the Shutdown*, gives an accurate and detailed answer. The first part, written by Clague and Couper, deals with the similarities and differences between the careers of the workers in the two plants during the first eleven months after the shutdown. The second part, written by Bakke, continues the life-story of the New Haven workers for two more years. The whole study thus provides a dynamic, as well as a static, picture of unemployed human beings.

These workers were not discharged for incompetence. They were not "unemployable" or "inferior." They were not in any way responsible for the loss of their sustenance. Yet they bore the main burden of the crisis. Dismissal wages from the company helped some, and charity a very little. In New Haven an average wage in

1928 for the men of \$1,250 and for the women of \$762 declined steadily in each of the three years until in the third year the average man was receiving \$557 and the average woman \$386. Only 2.4 per cent of this loss was reimbursed by charity the first year, and only 7.3 per cent the third year. "In spite of the efforts of the community to bear the burden of unemployment through private contributions and taxes, the real 'burden of unemployment' still rests upon the shoulders of the unemployed themselves."

The effect upon their standard of living was disastrous, and the loss of purchasing power bad for the business of the two cities. Even those workers who obtained new jobs had, in the majority of cases, to accept less pay; and many had to take jobs requiring less skill and carrying less social prestige. The skilled workers, strangely, were penalized more than the semi-skilled and unskilled. Not only did they lose more working time, but also a greater percentage of their previous wages. "Apparently the very specialization and application to the learning of a valuable skill make a man less fitted than his workmate of lower occupational status for the task of readjustment."

Job-hunting for the workers was a hit-or-miss endeavor. Their outlook, through long habituation, was limited to industrial wage-earning. The few who went into farming or into business for themselves were not in the main successful. Hartford tried to find jobs for them, but the effect was much the same as in New Haven where no organized community effort was made.

About fifteen per cent of the families went into debt to survive the crisis. Many resorted to the sweated industries, especially the women. Readjustment was handicapped, in approximately one-fourth of the families, by severe illness involving heavy medical expense and often loss of wages. Home ownership and other ties also proved handicaps when a new job could be had by moving.

The study as a whole presents such a clear and well-analyzed picture of the situation that no one interested in unemployment should miss reading it.

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